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A B S T R A C T
This article suggests the analytic lens of cultural, social and national reproduction to understand the centrality of
gendered and ethnic relations, in particular a focus on family life in contemporary UK. Proposing a theoretical
focus on reproduction, the article then provides some contextualisation with wider European experiences to
show connections between the political articulations across the far-right and mainstream right-wing. It argues
that there is much overlap between the far-right and mainstream rightwing, conservative gender and family
ideologies, where contradictory aspects of their gender and family ideals (simultaneously progressive and tra-
ditional) are articulated as care for the nation's future. Care is then articulated for the purpose of racist activism
and constructing governmental belonging. The racialized migrant family plays a central role in these debates,
marking the boundaries of the nation. The article explores these issues in depth through the example of material
and symbolic constructions of the racialized migrant family as undeserving of care, exempliﬁed through the UK
policy of No Recourse to Public Funding.
Introduction
Current far-right and populist right-wing cultural rhetoric in Europe
cohere around the imagination of a beleaguered continent, under threat
from multiculturalism and overbearing feminism. While organization-
ally distinct, there is also much overlap and cross-over between far-
right, populist rightwing and conservative discourses on gender, race
and migration. Feminism and multiculturalism are presented as chal-
lenging the social order that makes the nation a ‘homely’ space. This
discourse views white, hegemonic masculinities and femininities as
under threat and presents right-wing activists as saviours of the nation.
This article brings a new approach to current critical anti-racist feminist
debates on these issues in particular with a focus on the UK. The article
suggests that the analytic lens of reproduction oﬀers a productive way
of understanding these issues. It argues that a broad notion of cultural,
social and national reproduction is helpful in understanding the cen-
trality of gendered, racism and nation, in particular through a focus on
the racialized migrant family. The analysis speciﬁcally looks at how the
nation is reproduced through the control and management of the ra-
cialized migrant family by the nation state. After introducing the the-
oretical approach to reproduction, the article outlines the increasing
inﬂuence of far right and populist right wing discourses on migration
and gender on conservative and mainstream politics. It then moves to
explore current policies within the UK which symbolically and
economically marginalize racialized migrant families. The article ar-
gues that despite diﬀerences in right-wing and populist politics, the UK
context has focused on demonizing racialized migrant families. In
particular, through policies that realize a ‘hostile climate’ to migration,
such as the policy of No Recourse to Public Funds (NRPF), migrant
families have been experiencing increasing racist exclusions – often
despite having been settled in the UK for many years. These racist ex-
clusions have made the reproduction of their families extremely diﬃ-
cult. While migrants' paid work, whether in the formal or informal
sector has been central to the reproduction of the nation through care
work and services (such as cleaning, catering, restaurant and domestic
work), these policies target migrants' ability to reproduce their own
families with dignity. Exploring the reproduction of the nation through
social, gendered, cultural and racist discourses and policies can help
develop analysis and activism to strengthen anti-racist and feminist
politics.
Theorizing reproducing the nation
Increasingly visible populist right and far right movements try to
center white, heterosexual hegemonic masculinities and speciﬁc ver-
sions of femininities proclaimed to be ‘traditional’ as protecting the
future of the nation. These groups cast themselves as saviours and
protectors of a nation in danger of two evils: Firstly, they portray a
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danger of being outnumbered by immigrants and their uncontrolled
fertility, which they fear may lead to an estrangement from ‘their’
cultural tradition. This would change the homely nation's cultural
character and challenge its social and cultural cohesion. The second
danger, according to these right-wing populists emanates from pa-
tronizing governmental and educational institutions, as they aim to ‘re-
educate’ the population into accepting particular versions of gender
equality. This fear is stoked by the fantasy of overpowering feminist
institutions. The populist right claims that these twin dangers need to
be averted for the sake of creating a homely nation for themselves.
However, time and intergenerational continuity play an important part
in this argument. Thus, these right-wing discourses project a view of the
homely nation into the past. This golden past of social and cultural
cohesion around a uniﬁed national identity, they argue, was produced
and held together by a traditional version of the family. These right-
wing discourses claim particular urgency and legitimacy by further-
more imagining the future of the nation through the topic of family.
Indeed, they view themselves as custodians for the future of the nation's
legitimate, i.e. white, heterosexual, children. It is in this sense, that
what is at stake in these populist right-wing struggles around gender,
sexuality, migration and race is the reproduction of the nation through
the generations.
There is a large and sustained body of feminist research on gender
and nation, drawing out the historical signiﬁcance of the practice of
mothering, maternalist and natalist policies in diﬀerent national and
political contexts (e.g. Albanese, 2006), the signiﬁcance of women's
movements for developing citizenship struggles on the transnational
level (Berkovitch, 1999) as well as nationally. Furthermore, authors
have emphasised the links between empire, nation building and
creating gender regimes, as well as sexual norms (e.g. Blom, Hagemann,
& Hall, 2000; Mayer, 2000; McClintock, 1993). The relationship be-
tween gender, nation and politics has developed diﬀerentially de-
pending on national and political contexts (Anthias & Yuval-Davis,
1989; Yuval-Davis, 1997, 2011; Mosse, 1985). While socially con-
servative forces have portrayed feminism as a Western, imperial im-
position, Jayawerdena (2016) has shown the centrality of struggles for
gender equality in the context of Third World nationalisms. While po-
litical and citizenship rights as well as policy analysis are important
approaches to understand the relationship between gender and nation,
we also know that cultural representations of the nation are saturated
with gendered meanings and conversely ideas about proper gender
performances are themselves part and parcel of struggles around na-
tional identities (Cussack, 2003). Building on this body of work, this
article goes beyond this literature in explicitly developing the potential
of the analytic notion of reproduction to the contemporary European
moment of right-wing political hegemony, focusing on the UK.
Women play an important role in constructing national identities:
on one hand as symbols of the nation, embodying its values, on the
other, in their role as mothers, women transmit culture and values to
the next generation, as well as biologically reproducing the group.
Thus, mothers are seen as safeguarding group continuity (Anthias &
Yuval-Davis, 1989, Yuval-Davis, 1997, 2011). At a moment, where
culture is becoming a central marker of diﬀerence and justiﬁcation for
racialization, ‘gendered bodies and sexuality play pivotal roles as ter-
ritories, markers and reproducers of the narratives of nations’ (Yuval-
Davis, 1997:39). Yet, women are also social and political actors in their
own right who may engage in particular projects of building commu-
nities and contesting dominant national projects. The nation is often
imagined in familial metaphors, a representation that legitimizes in-
equalities within and between nations as natural since they were seen
as stemming from naturalised gender and age diﬀerences (McClintock,
1993). In images of the nation, gender has long played a key diﬀer-
entiating role. Mosse (1985) suggests that those elements of the nation
which were supposed to safeguard continuity and cultural longevity
have been symbolised by female ﬁgures. Male symbols and ﬁgures, on
the other hand, he suggests, have been used to represent the
modernising and progressive aspects of the nation. While this may not
hold true for all gendered representations of the nation, it is important
to note that gendered imaginations of the nation have been instru-
mental in reconciling contradictory aspects of the nation. The use of
gendered representations has served to make contradictions such as
continuity and change, adherence to tradition as well as embracing of
modernity, equality and democracy more coherent in the imagination
of the nation.
Thus, struggles around gender have been central to ideas and re-
presentations of the nation. One key aspect of this, on which this article
is focusing, are struggles on the reproduction of the nation. Much of the
work of social and cultural reproduction of the nation is undertaken by
women, be it in the realm of the family or through educational in-
stitutions, women play an important role in reproducing the nation
(Balibar, 1991). Reproduction thus includes both the daily and inter-
generational.
processes involved in maintaining and reproducing people, speciﬁ-
cally the labouring population (…) It involves the provision of food,
clothing, shelter, basic safety, and health care, along with the devel-
opment and transmission of knowledge, social values, and cultural
practices and the construction of individual and collective identities
(Bezanson & Luxton, 2006: 3).
This deﬁnition highlights the multiple aspects of reproduction and
their interplay. The concept of reproduction are multifaceted, encom-
passing socio-structural aspects of the reproduction of the labour force,
for example, as well as cultural and symbolic elements where women
and the family are constructed as transmitters of a national identity,
while other approaches highlight the agency involved in practices of
reproduction. On one hand, reproduction often refers to the processes
of conception, pregnancy, childbearing and the biological making of
children. Indeed, biological and cultural reproduction are often con-
ﬂated, when childbearing and rearing is named in one breath. Quite
distinctly from this, in Marxist analyses, social reproduction refers to
the reproduction of the class relations. Marx noted that the production
process is continuous, and that every process of production is at the
same time a process of reproduction. In that sense, the conditions of
production create not only commodities and surplus-value, but they
also produce and reproduces the exploitative capital-relation itself
(Luxton, 2006:29). As Fraser (2016: 101) argues,
reproductive ‘activity forms capitalism's human subjects, sustaining
them as embodied natural beings, while also constituting them as social
beings, forming their habitus and the cultural ethos in which they
move. The work of birthing and socializing the young is central to this
process, as is caring for the old, maintaining households, building
communities and sustaining the shared meanings, aﬀective dispositions
and horizons of value that underpin social cooperation.’
This sense of the combined aspects of reproduction as an activity
that reproduces humans as social and cultural beings while at the same
time reproducing the cultural, social and economic structures, in-
cluding inequalities, is helpful, I suggest, for understanding the posi-
tioning of racialized migrant families in contemporary Europe and the
UK more speciﬁcally.
Bourdieu'sian accounts have added to these insights into cultural
reproduction, chieﬂy through the processes of education and building
formal and informal cultural capital. Bourdieu and Passeron (1990)
have argued that cultural capital is central to the reproduction of so-
ciety, at once transmitting knowledge and cultural tools while also
transmitting from generation to generation cultural, economic and so-
cial inequalities. Bourdieu's work has focused on the reproduction of
classed inequalities, however it has also been usefully applied and de-
veloped to analyse and critique how cultural capital reﬂects and re-
inforces ethnic, racial and gender inequalities (Erel, 2010; Lareau &
Horvat, 1999). In Bourdieu'sian accounts, both the family and the
education system become key agents in transmitting cultural capital
and – directly or indirectly - economic capital. For the purposes of this
article, I will be focusing on the family rather than educational
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institutions. The family acts as a main conduit of capital, including
national privileges, between generations and therefore is a key element
of reproduction strategies (Bourdieu, 1996; Turner, 2008). However, it
is important to bear in mind that what and who counts as family cannot
be taken for granted as this changes both within and across social
formations. While some family forms are privileged before others, both
in material and symbolic terms, people's ability to identify with the
idealised family forms constitutes a privilege in itself,
‘the privilege of being comme il faut, conforming to the norm and
therefore enjoying a symbolic proﬁt of normality. Those who have the
privilege of having a normal family are able to demand the same of
everyone without having to raise the question of the conditions (e.g. a
certain income, living space, etc.) of universal access to what they de-
mand universally’ (Bourdieu, 1996: 23).
This becomes particularly pertinent when we look at the denigra-
tion of racialized migrant family forms in contemporary Europe, where
it is often the family which is blamed for a supposed lack of integration
and cultural capital of ethnic minority children (Kraler, 2010;
Vacchelli, 2017). Increasingly, the onus for social and cultural re-
production is shifted from states to individuals. Reproductive activity
takes place through states, markets, communities and families, his-
torically taking diﬀerent forms. In capitalist societies, there is a sys-
temic contradiction between the (largely unpaid) reproductive labour
needed to sustain capital accumulation on one hand and on the other
hand, capitalism's drive towards capital accumulation undermines the
possibilities of reproduction by increasing the marketization of re-
production and decreasing the time and other resources available for
unpaid care work (Fraser, 2016:100).
While this inherent contradiction of capitalism and social re-
production is not new, it is articulated in a particularly dramatic crisis
form in the neoliberal era. The shift to neoliberalism has decreased state
support for reproduction and depleted community resources. Women's
unpaid reproductive labour in the family has long served to buﬀer the
eﬀects of insuﬃcient resources for reproduction, however the neo-
liberal intensiﬁcation of the demands of paid work, leaving less time,
money and other resources to families and communities, has severely
impacted the capacity for reproduction, in particular of the poorest and
most vulnerable households.
The systemic capitalist crisis of social reproduction is therefore
currently sharpened and articulated in a double bind: while families
and communities are increasingly made responsible for reproduction,
their capacities to perform reproductive work have been undermined.
As a result, social reproduction has been ‘commodiﬁed for those who
can pay for it and privatized for those who cannot’ (Fraser, 2016:104).
When it comes to migrants, the family's ability and conditions to
reproduce ‘comme il faut’, that is, according to governmental norms of
what counts as properly ‘integrated’ or capable of integration, is being
policed through a shift to temporary residence statuses (Kofman,
Raghuram, & Raghuram, 2015: 154). In particular those migrants who
are categorised as less skilled are increasingly excluded or marginalized
and their ability to reproduce their own families is being circumscribed
despite the fact that they often play a key part in the social and cultural
reproduction of the nations in which they live through their paid work
in cleaning, care, domestic work, education and services such as ca-
tering and restaurants (Ibid.). These multiple aspects of the concept of
reproduction make it useful as a lens for exploring right-wing populist
movements' focus on gendered, sexual and ethnic equalities, as en-
dangering their sense of a homely nation.
Context: contemporary right-wing debates on gender, family and nation in
post-crisis Europe
This section critically analyses the role that the politics of social and
cultural reproduction play in contemporary European debates on ra-
cialized migrant family life. This does neither aim to provide an ex-
haustive account of these debates, nor a comparison between countries,
but rather this section aims at providing a context assembling the
analytical tools for understanding how the racialized migrant family.
Plays a key role in racist discourses on the national family and gender
and migration. This lays the ground for my argument in the next section
to show the impact of migration policies on migrant families and the
racist inequalities of reproduction these create for migrant families.
Spierings et al. (2015:3) argue that populist right-wing parties have
become the most successful new group of political parties in decades.
An emphasis on traditional gender relations is a key element of populist
right parties, however, it is not clear in how far this distinguishes new
populist right-wing parties from socially conservative parties. Indeed,
here my focus is on the common discursive constructions of the racia-
lized migrant family across repertoires of far-right, populist right and
mainstream conservative politics. One central argument of con-
temporary right-wing populist parties combines gender politics and
anti-Muslim racism: A key argument to legitimise this racism is that
‘Islamic values are at odds with liberal democratic values, such as the
autonomy of the individual, democracy, emancipation of homosexuals
and women, equality of men and women, freedom of expression, and
separation of church and state’ (Spierings et al., 2015: 8–9). However
this argument is also increasingly central to mainstream political de-
bates in Europe. While there is on one hand considerable variation in
the ways discourses on gender are mobilized by far-right parties, there
is also some overlap between the ways gender is constructed among
socially conservative, far-right and everyday racist discourses (cf.
Keskinen, 2013:225).
While populist right-wing parties emphasise the central role the
supposed European achievement of gender equality plays in con-
stituting a European cultural identity that legitimizes anti-Muslim ra-
cism, at the same time many of these populist right-wing groups ac-
tively question feminist achievements. Thus, activism around the
phenomenon of ‘antigenderism’, mobilising far-right, socio-politically
conservative and religious groups and ideas has gained momentum in
several European countries. These movements, argue Kováts, Põim, and
Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (2015): 11) ‘want to claim that gender equality
is an “ideology” (…) The main targets are the alleged “propaganda” for
LGBTI rights, for reproductive rights and biotechnology, for sexual and
equality education’. One example of this has been explored by Blum
(2015) who shows in the German context, that while mainstream par-
ties and small populist right-wing groups are not oﬃcially connected on
an organizational level, there are strong interpersonal links. Analysing
the similarities and diﬀerences between the Christian Democratic Union
(CDU) - a conservative mainstream party - the Alternative für
Deutschland (AfD) a recent extreme right-wing party with neoliberal
orientations and the long established fascist Nationale Partei Deutsch-
lands (NPD) she ﬁnds that all three parties enshrine the heterosexual
nuclear family as the building stone of society in their party pro-
grammes, while the AfD aims to ‘promote families “more cohesively as
a future investment and part of the generational contract”, the NPD sees
the so-called ‘traditional family’ as essential for the ‘perseverance of the
German nation, rejecting same-sex partnerships altogether’ (Blum,
2015:43). The NPD openly propagates eugenicist positions through
racist and homophobic initiatives by its youth organisation such as a
campaign in 2013 where they agitated for “Condoms for foreigners and
selected Germans!”. This campaign sought racial purity through pro-
moting contraception for migrant families and rejecting gay adoption
rights. Rather than teaching diversity in schools, they propose healthy
nutrition classes for heterosexual white German families. This promo-
tion of white heterosexual German families and control of migrant fa-
milies’ reproduction is intended to prevent ‘national death’ (Blum,
2015: 45–46).
While CDU and AfD as more mainstream parties oﬃcially support
some aspects of gender equality, local-level and online collaborative
initiatives, combining anti-Muslim, racist, homophobic, anti-genderism
discourses are notable for bringing together diﬀerent reactionary
groups and mobilising them into action around the focus of traditional,
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national gender and family roles (cf. Scott, 2013). As Andrea Pető notes,
this ease of mobilising populist activism contrasts with the diﬃculties
of mainstream politics to engage people (Pető, 2015: 126), suggesting
that a Gramscian struggle for hegemony over the deﬁnition of European
traditions is being played out. Exploring these movements as hege-
monic struggles to establish a new right-wing common sense is useful
for understanding often disparate and even contradictory elements of
populist right-wing discourses and agendas on the nation, gender and
the family. This struggle for hegemony, selectively draws on discursive
strategies such as the emphasis on European, modern values supportive
of more egalitarian gender roles when demarcating a supposed national
or European identity from stereotypical constructions of ‘Muslim’ fa-
milies. But this common sense is ﬂexible and can at the same time
emphasise the desirability of stable family relations for the supposedly
ideal national family. Indeed, these contradictions are part and parcel
of common sense, which is ‘fragmentary, incoherent (…) not something
rigid and immobile but is continually transforming itself, enriching it-
self with scientiﬁc ideas and with philosophical opinions which have
entered ordinary life’ (Gramsci, 1971:326). The ﬂexible and fragmen-
tary character of common sense further works through ascribing par-
ticular, polarized, characteristics to speciﬁc ethnic groups. For example
in the UK in the 1980s and 90s, the image of a supposed white British
family norm was discursively stabilized by ascribing to Muslim and
Asian families the characteristic of being ‘too’ traditional (e.g. through
strong, close family relations across generations and nuclear families)
while Caribbean families were pathologized as being too far removed
from an assumed norm of a ‘traditional’ two parent family (Alexander,
2002; Phoenix & Woollett, 1991; Rattansi, 1992; Reynolds, 2005). In
this case, the polarized ethnicised pathologization of diﬀerent family
forms was used to establish a common sense about a white British fa-
mily norm, despite increasing empirical diversity of family lives. Such
struggles around hegemonizing gendered identities are closely bound
up with struggles around who has a right to manage the nation. As
Keskinen (2013) argues, right-wing movements' rhetoric aims to chal-
lenge a supposed marginalization of white masculinities through mul-
ticulturalism and feminism. Her study on Finnish far-right intellectuals
suggests that they present themselves as protecting the endangered
“Western civilisation” from feminist and multiculturalist ideas which
are seen to undermine it. The right-wing intellectual political project is
to construct ‘white border guard masculinities’ who exercise their right
to control borders of sexuality, gender identity, race and immigration
(see Keskinen in this SI). This form of dominant identity politics por-
trays the future of the nation as threatened by demographic changes
caused by immigration and the ‘excessive’ birthrates of migrants on one
hand and the lack of white national women's reproductive activity on
the other. This struggle about the nation's future is part of their exercise
of ‘governmental belonging’ (Hage, 1998), that is the right to deﬁne the
nation as a ‘home’. The capacity to deﬁne the nation as their home,
entails the deﬁnition of what can count as a proper family, which types
and forms of families can legitimately claim belonging to the nation.
The homely nation is formulated as a goal orientating ‘the nationalist's
practices (…) to help make true the integrity of the nation’ (Hage, 1998:
42). Yet, rather than a concrete situation, the homely national family
always ﬁgures as something lost through the inﬂuence of migration and
gender equality politics. Claiming a right to manage the nation in such a
way that it remains homely is an exercise in governmental belonging.
Doty (2003), drawing on Deleuze and Guattari argues that the desire for
social order reﬂects a ‘paranoid’ impulse of state craft: ‘channeling,
organizing, inscribing of desire is accomplished through a wide array of
practices, which enable communication, create meanings, values,
hierarchies, inclusions, and exclusions.’ (p. 10). Indeed, the desire for
social order expressed in the categorizing and control of those marked
as immigrants, is one articulation of how institutionally, in policy but
also in everyday life the state is manifested so that the categorizing and
marginalization of racialized migrant families can be sen as an act of
paranoid state craft, at the same time as claim to governmental
belonging.
Claiming governmental belonging can also draw on discourses of
caring for the nation. One example for the centrality of the discourse of
care to right-wing debates on nation and family has been shown by
Mulinari and Neergaard's (2014) analysis of the Sweden Democrats.
Like other populist movements, the Sweden Democrats claim to re-
present the true feelings of common people against socially engineered
policies of gender equality. The party constructs the nation as based on
similarity and solidarity, while families are seen as based on com-
plementary gender roles. While male members' identiﬁcation with the
party is based on the idea of reclaiming a masculinity in charge of fa-
milies and able to ‘protect’ their children through being citizens in
work. This is reﬂected in the party's natalist policy aims to lower
Swedish abortion rates to avoid the need for immigration to counteract
population aging. As Per Björklund, member of the party executive,
argues:
In Sweden, a woman gives birth to an average of 1.8 children. In
order to maintain a stable population (without immigration), a required
birth rate is slightly above 2. The low birth rate will lead to signiﬁcant
strains on pensions and healthcare. The politically correct want to solve
this by mass immigration from countries with a high birth rate, that is,
the Middle East and North Africa. As a Sweden Democrat I realize that
such a policy will lead to a disastrous clash of cultures which will
eventually break down our Sweden. Would it not be better pursuing a
policy that lowers the abortion rate instead?(cited in Mulinari &
Neergaard, 2014: 47).
This natalist policy is clearly linked with a desire to curb im-
migration and the birth rates of immigrants, to protect national iden-
tity. Female activists, in contrast construct a discourse of justifying
racism through their care for the nation. They redeﬁne good mothering
as caring for their children by protecting them from migrants' supposed
violence. While this care aims to create a better future for their chil-
dren, it also addresses immigrants, who, it is argued, would be better oﬀ
in their own countries. In this sense the exclusionary racist desire to
expel immigrants becomes a sign of care.
In this section I have shown how contemporary European right-wing
movements use discourses on nation, gender and family to construct the
boundaries of the nation. While the supposedly European achievement of
gender equality is often invoked to justify racisms, in particular against
Muslims, gender diﬀerences are often emphasised, justifying gendered
inequalities. Ideas about ‘traditional’ family forms are at the heart of
struggles around gendered identities. These in turn are closely linked to
natalist, racist ideas about who should and who should not reproduce. As
Bonizzoni (forthcoming) points out, there is an emergent transnational
discourse converging mainstream ‘fears of hyper-fertile baby machines
(Chavez, 2004, 2013) among (racial/ethnic, classed, religious) “others”’
and fears that the existing demographic order will be challenged by ‘an
alleged Muslim plot to take over Europe through excessive reproduction
resonating in right-wing nationalist parties‘ (Bonizzoni, 2017, no page
number). Related to this, the language of care for the nation can be suc-
cessfully mobilized to justify racist exclusions of migrants. These dis-
courses, then centrally are about hegemonizing right-wing visions of how
best to reproduce the nation.
Racialized migrant families in the UK
While the previous section looked at some key elements in con-
temporary right-wing discourses on nation, gender and family, in this
section I will look more speciﬁcally at how these debates on gender,
race, migration are articulated in the UK in particular focusing on the
way in which racialized migrant families are positioned materially and
symbolically as outsiders to the nation. This outsider status means that
they are positioned as not deserving access to welfare and other re-
sources of the nation-state to reproduce their families. The terminology
I use here is ‘racialized migrant families’, which contains both de-
scriptive and analytic elements. The families I am referring to here have
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migration experiences. Especially the example on economic margin-
alization I explore below refers to families where some members are
subject to immigration control. However, it is also important to ac-
knowledge that experience of migration in itself does not necessarily
mean social marginalization, in particular for wealthy migrants and
those categorised as white, hailing from the global North. At the same
time, Black and Minority Ethnic UK citizens who do not have personal
migration experience but have lived and settled in the UK, at times for
generations, also experience racism in the labour market, education,
service provision and in symbolic and political representations (Erel,
Karim, & Zaki, 2016). One of the pernicious eﬀects of contemporary
right wing discourse is that it activates the representation of ethnic
minorities as recently arrived migrants (Khan & Weekes-Bernard,
2015). While this problematically denies the contributions, participa-
tion and belonging of all ethnic minorities, it is particular problematic
for post-colonial Black and ethnic minorities as it contributes to the
denial of colonial and post-colonial links, encouraging a historical
amnesia of the brutalities and exploitation of colonialism and how these
shaped global inequalities, including the wealth of contemporary
Europe and the UK, underlying much of contemporary migration
movements. Migrants thus are presented as if the countries they come
from were disconnected from and not entitled to any of the welfare and
wealth of European nation states (Bhambra, 2015; Gutiérrez Rodríguez,
2016; Gutiérrez Rodríguez et al., 2010; Wearing, 2017). This forgets
that the wealth enabling welfare systems has been built on the ex-
ploitation of the global South, in particular the former colonies
(Andrews, 2017).
This section draws on secondary material, to explore how the
symbolic and economic marginalization and discrimination of racia-
lized families are linked. Looking at discursive marginalization of ra-
cialized migrant families, I argue, that this forms a justiﬁcation for the
economic exclusion of racialized migrant families, in particular by ex-
cluding them from access to welfare. In a double move, then, these
exclusions feedback to discourses on what counts as normative family
life worthy of care and protection – racialized migrant families who are
economically excluded because of their symbolic exclusion can at the
same time serve as a symbol for families outside the norm, and hence
outside the reach of the nationalized feeling of care for families. These
racialized inequalities in the conditions for social reproduction are
closely linked up with the normalisation of right-wing understandings
of creating a homely nation, by caring for ethnic majority citizens and
upholding gender ideals which both materially and symbolically ex-
clude and subordinate racialized migrant families. Here, my focus will
be in particular on how in the aftermath of austerity and an increasing
climate of hostility towards migrants, Black and migrant families in the
UK experience marginalization as outsiders to the nation. This takes up
an earlier argument which points out overlaps, parallels and the ways in
which discourses on gender, race, ethnicity and migration can coalesce
across conservative, right-wing, far-right parties.
Historical context: The racialized migrant family in UK nation-building
Like many other European countries, the UK has increasingly po-
liced the immigration of families, while also targeting migrant families
through integration policies. The early 2000s saw an increasing focus
on policing family related migration. This was ideologically constructed
as part and parcel of a move from multiculturalism to the promotion of
social cohesion and British values. This promotion of social cohesion
and British values was in response to the international events of the 9/
11 attacks and the ensuing war on terror on the one hand and on the
other hand the racially inﬂected urban unrest in the North of England.
The Cantle (2001) diagnosed the fact that white and Muslim commu-
nities lead separate lives as the cause of the urban unrest, arguing that
greater social cohesion across ethnic communities was required. As the
onus for such greater cohesion was put on the racialized ethnic mino-
rities, family and intimate relations of friendship became a way in
which both migrants and also established ethnic minorities were incited
to demonstrate their commitment to Britishness by foregrounding in-
timate relationships with local communities before any possible trans-
national unions to prove their love of the nation (Ahmed, 2004; Fortier,
2008). Thus, the family life of racialized migrants became a focus of
policy in the areas of integration and social cohesion and migration
policy. In particular, family formation and uniﬁcation were targeted as
spouses of UK residents (both with and without British citizenship)
were subjected to increasingly onerous rules.
This builds on a long history of ‘marriage restrictions’ by British
policy. Turner (2015) argues that current family migration rules have a
legacy that goes back to the British state regulating relations between
colonisers and colonized. Eugenicist discourses around such marriage
restrictions were racialized and aﬀected the construction of desirable and
undesirable families in 19th century Britain as well as the colonies. These
concerns around regulating racialized boundaries of family life were
revived in response to post- World War II migration of racialized British
citizens from the empire to the motherland. While this migration had
been enabled by the 1948 Nationality Act and encouraged by labour
recruitment drives, from the 1960s onwards successive legislation aimed
to restrict the number of colonial (later post-colonial) subjects with a
right to move to and settle in the UK. However, racist concerns about
preventing men from the British colonies entering relationships with
white British women shaped immigration policy, creating a ‘limited
preference for family uniﬁcation’ for female spouse migration from the
British commonwealth to ‘manage and foster the intimate site of the
‘migrant family’ (Turner, 2015: 632). Yet, in the late 1960s the migrant
family was increasingly seen as problematic: ‘fertile breeding ground for
diﬀerence inside the ‘pure’ national space.’ (ibid. 633). Family migration
was cast as suspicious, and in particular female marriage migrants from
South Asia, were expected to prove that their marriage was genuine.
During the 1970s a deeply racist and sexist technique of so-called ‘vir-
ginity tests' through gyneacological examinations when applying for
visas or at the border were applied to South Asian applicants for mar-
riage migration, drawing on colonial ‘images of the chaste, virginal South
Asian wife (Levine, 2006 cited in Turner, 2015: 633, cf. Bhabha, Klug, &
Shutter, 1985, Smith & Marinella, 2011). In the 1980 regulations of that
migrant spouses had to prove that the ‘primary purpose’ of their mi-
gration was marriage (rather than the marriage being a pretext for en-
tering the UK, as was surmised), which discriminated in particular South
Asian female marriage migrants. The 1971 Patriality Act limited the right
of British Commonwealth migrants to enter the UK, allowing only those
whose grandfather had been born in the UK, this was timed in a way that
the vast majority of British subjects excluded from migrating and settling
in the UK were Black and Asian, while the vast marjority of those allowed
to settle were white (Dummett, 1986). Here, again, family relations
criteria in migration policy were used as a racial ﬁlter of migration
management and reproducing the nation. This is reﬂected in the ways in
which racialized families settled in the UK, whether citizens or not, were
represented in education, family policy and social work during the post
war period. A problem discourse prevailed, targeting ‘Asian’ families as
having ‘too much culture’ on one hand and Caribbean families as having
‘too little culture’ (Alexander, 2002). While the supposedly tightly knit
family structures of Asian families were lauded as beneﬁcial for chil-
dren's educational success, they were at the same time critiqued as too
controlling and therefore obstacles to cultural integration (Rattansi,
1992). Some Caribbean families' forms of young motherhood and high
percentages of single motherhood, on the other hand were pathologised,
blamed for children's educational failure (Phoenix & Woollett, 1991;
Reynolds, 2005). These ascriptions, of course, were themselves part of
racializing everyday and institutional practices. However, the strategy of
invoking the ways in which racialized families diﬀered from a supposed
white British norm, allowed to ignore structural racism's eﬀects on fa-
milies. Despite the increasing variety of all ethnic groups' family lives,
this centred ideas of a ‘normal family’.
In 1997 the incoming Labour government overturned the primary
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purpose rule, introducing a family migration visa with linguistic and
ﬁnancial requirements. As marriage migrants ‘were likely to settle, gain
further rights of citizenship and raise children, the management of this
route was understood as central to social order. (…) the ‘migrant-
spouse’ was again viewed as a problem of ‘integration’ as they were
marked by racial, cultural and linguistic diﬀerence’ (Turner, 2015:634).
Underlying this policy was the representation of the marriage migrant
as female, oppressed by patriarchal family relationships, ill equipped to
adapt to British values and lifestyle, outside of the labour market and
therefore not ‘integrated’, since labour market participation was seen as
a key measure of integration. Yet, such representations were reinforced
by the exclusion of marriage migrants from many ﬁnancial beneﬁts and
initially from the labour market. This was strengthened in 2002, when
the two year probationary period on the family visa and a minimum age
of 21 was introduced (Kofman, 2004). From 2010 onwards, there was
furthermore a requirement to prove basic English (which was extended
to intermediate English in 2012) and a test of knowledge of life in the
UK. In 2012, furthermore, the family migration policy required that UK
sponsors of partners from non-EEA countries had to prove a minimum
income of £18,600 per annum (and additional income for each child),
raised from the previous threshold of £5500 per annum, making it the
country with the second highest minimum income threshold (Sirriyeh,
2015:233). Furthermore, foreign partners now have to wait for ﬁve
years (rather than the previous two years) before they can apply for
permanent settlement. The income based rules have been criticized for
discriminating against female sponsors, the young and those living
outside of London, as all of these groups are statistically likely to have
lower wages (Children's Commissioner, 2015). The severity of these
rules is illustrated by the fact that in 2012, 47% of the UK population
would not have met the income threshold to sponsor a foreign spouse.
Sirriyeh (2015) emphasizes that these new family migration rules dif-
ferentiate between desirable and undesirable family migrants on the
basis of class and income, which is often deeply entwined with ethnic
and racial status as particular ethnic groups are concentrated in low
income labour market sectors. Since 2012 this has aﬀected families
where one partner was allowed to live in the UK, but not the other,
leading to the separation of families, aﬀecting least 15,000 children. In
a survey, the Children's Commissioner has found that families and in
particular children suﬀer distress and anxiety as a result of separation
from a parent. It should be noted that in this survey 79% of aﬀected
children are British citizens, which means that their rights to a family
life are disregarded, as their families are both economically and sym-
bolically as marginalized migrants. This reinforces the point raised
above that the relationship between rights, racialization and migration
is complex, as these children, despite their citizenship are not enabled
to fulﬁl their rights to family life because at least one of their parents is
a non-British migrant. In this way, current family migration policy
painfully polices normative ideas on family life, in particular economic
self suﬃciency. In the following section I provide two in-depth ex-
amples of the ways in which since 2010, in austerity UK, the racialized
migrant family has been subject to marginalization. The ﬁrst example
looks at symbolic marginalization, analysing a speech by David Ca-
meron, while the second example shows the ways this has given rise to
economic marginalization through the No Recourse to Public Funds
Policy. By exploring one example of symbolic and one of economic
marginalization, the article shows the circular and iterative connection
of these realms: racialized migrant families who are economically ex-
cluded because of their symbolic exclusion can at the same time be used
to symbolize what it means to be a family who is not ‘normal’ and
‘comme il faut’.
Symbolic and Economic Marginalization of Racialized Migrant Families in
Austerity UK
Feminist critics point out that the austerity measures since the
Conservative- Liberal Democrat Coalition government in 2010 and the
Conservative government of 2014 have aﬀected women dis-
proportionately. The Women's Budget Group argues that ‘86% of sav-
ings in the period from 2010–2020 will have come from women's
pockets’ (2016): 3). Deep cuts to public services, which women rely on,
have detrimental eﬀects on women's living standards and on gender
equality. In particular female-headed households ‘will see the largest
drop in living standards over the 2010–20 period due to policy changes
with respect to tax, beneﬁts and public services’ with an average fall of
20% in living standards (2016a: 3). While current government policies
foreground paid work and do not invest in a caring economy – be it
unpaid care work or paid care work- the biggest growth in jobs has been
in low paid and precarious work. Indeed, through an intersectional
analysis, the Women's Budget Group shows that low income ‘black and
Asian women will lose around twice as much money as low income
white men’ by 2020 as a result of tax and beneﬁt changes (Women's
Budget Group and Runnymede Trust, 2016), as indeed low income
women, in particular single mothers are hardest hit by current austerity
policies.
Yet, it is important to acknowledge that for ethnic minority families,
austerity policies do not signify the beginning, but a continuation of a
squeeze on living standards, employment opportunities and access to
quality jobs and services. As Emejulu and Bassel (2015) argue, the ef-
fects of racism have meant that even before austerity, ethnic minority
groups have been disproportionately more likely to be unemployed or
underemployed, regardless of their educational levels and were con-
centrated in low paid, insecure jobs. While cuts to public services aﬀect
all women, in particular minority women are disadvantaged as they
were already in precarious situations. Furthermore minority women are
‘more likely to be employed in the public sector (as teachers, nurses and
social workers, etc.), more likely to be subcontracted to the state via
private sector organisations (as care workers, cleaners, caterers, etc.)
and are also more likely to be connected to the local state (through
accessing public services) because of gendered caring responsibilities.
Therefore, austerity measures clearly increase minority women's un-
employment whilst simultaneously reducing the scope, coverage and
access to public services’ (2015: 88).
While reducing access to public resources for families, the govern-
mental policies at the same time promote individual responsibility for
good parenting, presenting a ‘double bind’ where parents are more
vulnerable to austerity, while at the same time being held increasingly
accountable for their children's social mobility as well as the economic
and moral decline of the nation (Jensen & Tyler, 2012). Jensen and
Tyler's analysis focuses on parents marginalized in terms of class. Ethnic
minority and migrant parents are constructed diﬀerently: they are not
simply cast as responsible for the moral decline of the nation, instead
their moral and legal rights to belong are made conditional on their
performance of ‘good’ parenting. Good parenting, then is often sug-
gested as a precondition for full integration, however, racialized mi-
grant families continue to be simultaneously targeted by exclusionary
racism. This shows some aspects of the problematic character of dis-
courses of integration, where particular conditions are posited for mi-
grants, while at the same time it is often made impossible for migrants
to actually meet these conditions, be it through the eﬀects of structural
or interpersonal racism. Therefore, it is more useful to think of in-
tegration not simply as a ‘pathway’ for migrants to become further
engaged with their local context, but rather as a complex political and
discursive strategy of governmentality. This strategy demarcates those
marked as migrant and continuously, through institutional, political,
legal and everyday repetition, reinstates these boundaries and separate
identities of full citizen on one hand and migrant in need of integration
on the other (El-Tayeb, 2011).
One example for this were the recurrent public debates initiated by
then Prime Minister David Cameron since 2013 on whether EU mi-
grants should be entitled to child beneﬁts. Indeed, at one point, during
the negotiations with EU before the referendum on Britain's EU mem-
bership, he put this relatively minor and inexpensive policy issue ‘at the
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heart of his plans to recast Britain's EU membership’ (Kirkup, 2014).
This meant rendering it legitimate to question the right of migrant
workers who pay taxes, to access public resources for their families on a
par with non-migrants.
In January 2016, David Cameron targeted the right to symbolic
belonging of Muslim women, many of whom are British citizens. He
furthermore conﬂated their position with that of migrants in an article
he wrote in The Times, entitled: ‘We won't let women be second-class
citizens. Forcing all migrants to learn English and ending gender seg-
regation will show we're serious about creating One Nation’ (Cameron,
2017). He suggested that a large proportion of female migrants, Muslim
women in particular, did not have the English language skills to engage
with British values and culture. This, he argued was an important factor
in their children's potential radicalization, disengagement from British
life and involvement in terrorism. One problem with this argument is
the conﬂation of settled ethnic minority citizens with new migrants.
Such a conﬂation allows him to challenge the idea that migrants and
racialized citizens can fully belong to the nation (Erel, Reynolds, &
Kaptani, 2017). In this sense, the article portrayed Muslim women as
potential threats to social and cultural cohesion of the nation, and more
so, as potential educators of terrorists who endanger the safety of the
nation.
While the question of numbers of migrant children is not explicitly
problematized (as is the case in Sweden Democrats' or NPD's policies
discussed above), the supposedly high birthrates of migrant mothers are
regularly thematised in the press as an issue, as e.g. the Daily Mail's
(2015) headline reporting on population statistics shows: ‘Migrant baby
boom means one in four infants now born in the UK has a mother who
was born overseas and ﬁgure could reach one-in-three by 2021’, the
issue of future UK citizens being of migrant family background causes
alarm. This is often elaborated as a concern over overpopulation of the
UK as a small island, as for example McDonagh (2013) argues in a
Spectator blog entitled ‘Why doesn't David Attenborough blame Mus-
lims for overpopulation’.
‘In terms of British population growth, […] one reason why the
population is heading towards 70 million in 15 years is [….] that for-
eign born migrants are having quite large families (last year, nearly two
in three London births were to couples where one or both of the parents
was born abroad; in Britain as a whole, a quarter of births were attri-
butable to mothers born outside the UK – dunno about fathers). And
indeed in the bit of London I live in, the only big families I encounter
are the children trooping behind mothers from – I think – Somalia. The
middle classes round me are constrained by the most eﬀective contra-
ceptive known to humankind: the price of housing.
Here, we ﬁnd again a mixing of the categories of migrant and
Muslim as enemies within. The quote also implicitly challenges mi-
grants' family forms by questioning the place of fathers within these
families and ﬁnally emphasizes that racialized migrant families' re-
liance on welfare enables them to have a larger number of children than
the middle class self reliant neoliberal (and implicitly white) re-
sponsible parents like herself.
Since the British referendum on membership in the EU in June
2016, when a slim majority voted to leave the EU, there has been a
dramatic rise in racist and xenophobic attacks (The Independent, 2016)
directed against those identiﬁed as migrants, both EU and non-EU ci-
tizens. The referendum result has enabled people to express their gov-
ernmental belonging to the nation by challenging the right to be present
in the UK of those they perceive as migrants. This has resulted in racist
attacks, including a physical attack on a Muslim pregnant woman who
lost her unborn child as a consequence of the beating (BBC, 2016) and
the killing of a Polish man. Racist verbal abuse has become widespread,
for example a Finnish mother who was overheard in the street speaking
in Finnish with her children was told to ‘Go home to Poland!’ Indeed,
similar verbal challenges, to the right of both migrants but also ethnic
minority citizens of their right to be present in the UK have become an
everyday occurrence (Weaver & Laville, 2016). While it was primarily
migration from the EU that played a central role in political debates, it
should be noted that the subsequent rise in racist attacks was targeted
both EU and non-EU migrants, as well as settled British citizens, in-
cluding a rise in anti-Muslim attacks (Home Oﬃce, 2016; Institute of
Race Relations, 2016). As Virdee and McGeever (2017) argue, in the
campaign for Brexit and its aftermath far right and rightwing discourses
worked through activating longstanding racisms and conﬂated all
ethnic and racialized ‘Others’, not withstanding substantive diﬀerences
in the ways European, non EU migrants and racialized citizens are so-
cially positioned. It is against this backdrop that I want to focus on a
particular example of economic marginalization where the social and
cultural reproduction of migrants has been made almost impossible by
recent government policies.
An increasing number of migrants to the UK have become subject to
the ‘No Recourse to Public Funding’ policy which states that anyone
who is subject to immigration control cannot access public funds ac-
cording to Section 115 Immigration and Asylum Act 1999. This applies
to a wide range of migrants, such as those whose permission to be in the
UK is subject to a visa, including those joining spouses, visitors,
workers, students and family members as well as asylum seekers, re-
fused asylum seekers and those who overstayed their visa or entered the
UK without permission (Price & Spencer, 2015: 15). These migrants do
not have access to welfare beneﬁts including income-based job seeker's
allowance, housing beneﬁt, child beneﬁt and tax credits.
While this applies to adult migrants, those who have children may
under certain circumstances have access to support through local au-
thorities on the basis of Section 17 of the Children's Act which puts a
responsibility on local authorities to prevent all children (including
migrant children) who live in their area from becoming destitute. While
only a very small minority of migrant families become destitute,
nevertheless this group is signiﬁcant as it shows how the current hostile
environment casts particular migrants as outsiders to the nation who do
not deserve the resources to care for their children and themselves.
In a recent study Price and Spencer (2015) estimated that 3391
families and 5900 children received support through the Section 17 of
the Children's Act by local authorities in 2012/13, 19% more than the
previous year. This rapid growth is a consequence of increasingly strict
migration legislation, as well as fewer employment opportunities and
more stringent immigration requirements, as well as immigration
checks on employers. While most of these families were overstayers
(63%), others had papers to legally reside in the UK, the majority were
Jamaican and Nigerian nationals with close links to the UK due to the
history of colonialism and its eﬀects on the citizenship regime. Almost a
quarter (23%) of the families had at least one British child (Price &
Spencer, 2015: 26). This shows that it is not simply a matter of drawing
boundaries between those with a British passport and those without a
British passport. By undermining the family lives of these children with
British passports, the government policy demonstrates disregard for the
welfare and well being of these children and their families. These
British children, then, are constructed as less deserving of the welfare of
the state and quality care of their families because they are racialized
(cf. the situation of British children aﬀected by the family migration
rules who have been separated from a parent, Commissioner for
Children, 2015).
Many of these families had been living in the UK for many years,
having supported themselves by working formally or informally and
had been part of the social fabric through their workplaces, their chil-
dren's schools as well as faith based activities and volunteering. It is
problematic to invoke the notion that these families have fulﬁlled the
criteria of integration posited by the state, namely working, good par-
enting volunteering and participating in cross-ethnic networks, as this
invocation can be used to legitimately exclude others who are con-
structed as ‘less’ integrated. However, the reason for pointing out that
these families had fulﬁlled many of the criteria that policy explicitly
posits as conditions for integration, is to show the extent to which the
notion of integration is always constructed as just out of reach of
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migrants. New conditions or tighter rules can be applied by the gov-
ernment which redraw the boundaries between those who have fulﬁlled
and those who cannot fulﬁl the requirements for belonging.
Furthermore, it is also important to note that critieria for measuring
integration are not clear-cut, but instead both everyday, legal and in-
stitutional dynamics of constructing borders of who can claim to le-
gitimately belong are movable and change in diﬀerent political, his-
torical and situational contexts. (Most recently we are experiencing
how EU migrants in the UK are now again being constructed as out-
siders, while they had to a large extent since the 1990s been legally and
in everyday life regarded as ‘well integrated’.) For many of these ra-
cialized migrant families, then, despite having been part of the social
fabric through work, parenting and other acitivities, they were marked
as not rightfully belonging when they encountered situations of crisis,
such as ill health, the loss of a job, a relationship breakdown – often
precipitated through domestic violence – and became unable to support
themselves and their families. Initially many turned to networks of
friends, family, faith or ethnic organizations for support (Price &
Spencer, 2015). However, such support could be very ambiguous:
heightened dependency also exposed the women to economic and
sexual exploitation and posed risks to the children. Furthermore, such
informal networks, whether exploitative or benign were only able to
support the families for limited periods of time. When such arrange-
ments came to an end, the women became destitute and homeless. Yet,
accessing local authority support for their children was challenging as
they had to go through various stages of assessment. Often, this as-
sessment included encouragement to go back to their home countries,
which the vast majority did not want to do. Furthermore, though this is
not legal, parents routinely reported that they had been threatened that
their children could be taken into care if they were unable to materially
support them. If the assessment is favourable, families can get access to
accommodation, and some ﬁnancial support for the basics. However,
often the accommodation is not suitable, as it could be in Bed and
Breakfasts, often sharing bathrooms, toilets and cooking facilities with
others, including sometimes drug users or other people by whom the
family might feel intimidated. Many families report that accommoda-
tion poses a risk to their health, through being infested by vermin,
humidity, mould and similar. The level of ﬁnancial support provided
varies greatly but forced families to ‘survive on subsistence rates below
those deemed minimal for any other category of people in the UK’
(Price & Spencer, 2015: 58). In addition, families can also be sent to
remote places by the local authorities they apply to for support, this
could be small towns, where families feel extremely isolated and bereft
of social support networks (Topping, 2015).
While for some families this is a short-term situation of up to six
months, after which they ﬁnd other solutions of support, more than a
third of families have been in this extremely harsh situation for one to
three years, and 7% even more than three years. The insecurity about
the future leads to a feeling of limbo ‘I can't go forward, I can't go back,
it's no way to live for anybody’ as one parent states (Price & Spencer,
2015:56).
The example of families aﬀected by the No Recourse to Public
Funding policy shows how migrants can be extremely marginalized
from the social fabric, even where they had previously been able to
fulﬁl the conditions imposed by the state to classify migrants as ‘well
integrated’. As the state denies these migrant families access to social
rights, and creates a parallel, minimal, welfare provision for them, these
families are constructed as outsiders to the nation. They are cast out
from any but the most minimal responsibility of care. Thus, migrant
parents, where they are subject to immigration control, are positioned
in such a way to deny them the resources to care for themselves and
their children in a digniﬁed way.
This extreme form of marginalization centers the idea of a national
community which does not owe care to migrants, even though migrants
themselves form a key part of the workforce in care and social re-
production. These policies limiting migrants' access to social rights and
belonging furthermore make it impossible for families subject to im-
migration control to see themselves or be seen as a ‘normal family’
(Bourdieu, 1996). These families subject to migration control do not
enjoy the privilege of being “comme il faut”, in this sense, being cast
out from the nation in material terms at the same time excludes these
families from the symbolic representation of the nation, as they do not
have the conditions to live or show the conditions of a ‘normal family’
life such as ‘certain income, living space, etc.’ (Bourdieu, 1996: 23).
Such exclusion through governmental policies justiﬁes and reinforces
racist and sexist practices and discourses where those who identify
themselves as rightfully belonging to the nation can then exercise
governmental belonging to exclude migrants as well as those racialized
bodies who are associated with migration, even if they legally hold
citizenship.
Conclusion
This paper has argued that an analytic framework of social and
cultural reproduction is helpful for understanding some key features of
the contemporary conﬂuence of right-wing politics of gender, ethnicity
and race. By looking at the unequal conditions for social and cultural
reproduction for racialized migrant families, the article has addressed
racist discourses in contemporary right-wing Europe, in particular
looking at the case of the UK. Theoretically, the article suggests that by
linking cultural and social reproduction, we can analytically connect
the gendered and racialized aspects of contemporary struggles around
the nation. Feminists have clearly shown the political and analytical
signiﬁcance of the neoliberal crisis of social reproduction for capitalism.
This article has contributed to that debate an analysis of how the ra-
cialized migrant family is becoming central to these debates in con-
temporary Europe. Such articulations of the link between gender and
racist discourses can be highly contradictory: they may at once promote
‘traditional’ gender roles and simultaneously justify racism against
ethnic minorities by claiming to embody European, ‘progressive’ ega-
litarian gender ideals. Furthermore, it is important to recognise that
there is ﬂuidity and overlap between the gendered and racialized dis-
courses of far-right, right-wing and mainstream politics.
Right-wing discourses identify a threat to the nation by racialized
migrant families. These discourses suggest that the nation needs to limit
its capacity for care to white national families. The migrant family,
instead is presented as a threat to the nation. I have reconstructed this
debate with examples from Europe, where right-wing discourses are
centred on questions about saving the future of the nation from over-
bearing feminist and multiculturalist institutions to re-center white
hegemonic masculinities and femininities. The idea of caring for the
nation is central to this. This is often expressed through the trope of the
future of the nation in danger. By constructing migrant families as
dangerously reproductive, these discourses claim the right and ne-
cessity for white nationals to exert governmental belonging to re-assert
the nation as homely. The family thus becomes a key site for con-
testations about how to reproduce the nation. Moving from these in-
sights to explore how hegemonic struggles around gender, race and
nation articulate in the contemporary UK, the paper has suggested that
symbolic and material marginalizations of racialized migrant families
have become important ways in which governmental belonging has
been articulated. Looking at discourses about Muslim, migrant and
racialized parents' rights to claim legitimate belonging, the article has
argued that these have become instrumental in legitimizing racist
constructions of the homely nation. The example of migrant families
that are subject to immigration control who have been pushed to the
extreme margins of the welfare state has demonstrated how immigra-
tion and welfare policy interact to construct racialized migrant families
as not entitled to the same care and welfare resources as national citi-
zens. This has shown how in contemporary austerity UK, racialized
migrant families are materially and symbolically constructed as out-
siders to the nation without the right to be cared for within the nation,
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nor the rights to care for their children in dignity.
These examples taken together show that an analytic lens of na-
tional, social and cultural reproduction is useful for exploring how in
the contemporary moment of austerity in Europe right-wing politics of
gender and race combine. Fantasies of a homely nation and postures of
governmental belonging allow majority citizens to imagine themselves
as managing the nation through the right to exclude. In an increasingly
harsh, individualized socio-economic climate such exclusionary racism
in the guise of care for the nation can provide symbolic capital to those
who imagine themselves as central to the racial, ethnic and gendered
identity of the nation. Such an understanding matters, not only as an
intellectual project, but also to bring together social and political
struggles against far-right, right-wing populist and conservative politics
targeting gender equality, feminisms, multicultural policies and mi-
grants' rights.
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